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REAL ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE  






The paper aims to assess the real economic convergence among 
eight CEE countries that accessed the EU, as well as their 
convergence with the EU. Two  aspects of convergence are 
analysed: (a) income convergence as a tendency to close the income 
gap; (b) cyclical convergence as a tendency to the conformity of 
business cycles. Income convergence is analysed in terms of b and s 
coefficients using regression equations between GDP per capita 
levels and GDP growth rates. Cyclical convergence is analysed using 
industrial production indexes and industrial confidence indicators. The 
analysis covers the period 1993-2004. The main findings may be 
summarised as follows: 1) CEE countries converge between 
themselves and towards the EU as regards the income level; 2) CEE 
countries reveal a good cyclical synchronisation with the EU; cyclical 
conformity within the region is better seen when the group is split into 
three subgroups: (a) Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, (b) 
Hungary and Poland, (c) the Baltic states. Both types of economic 
convergence are strongly affected by the dependence on the EU 
markets, including trade and capital flows. 
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   The concept of real economic convergence includes two aspects: 
(a) a tendency towards the equalisation of income and development 
levels, which may be called growth or income convergence, (b) a 
tendency among the countries towards the conformity of their 
business cycles, which may be called cyclical convergence. 
 
   Both concepts of economic convergence are basically independent 
and have to b e tested separately. The countries coming closer as 
regards their income levels need not reveal similar cyclical 
fluctuations and  vice versa, the countries with similar cyclical 
fluctuations need not come closer as regards their income levels. 
 
   Even if  income convergence may be derived from the intrinsic 
mechanism of economic growth, both types of economic 
convergence are closely related to international cooperation, including 
trade and capital flows, technology transfer, labour movement, 
increased competition, economies of scale, and policy coordination. 
Thus, there may be some interdependence, or at least correlation, 
between the two aspects of economic convergence, especially among 
the countries subject to an advanced integration process, which is the 
case in the enlarged EU. 
 
   While the traditional trade theory (Viner, 1950) implied that 
economic integration would lead to more convergence, some newer 
theories based on the new geography approach (Krugman, 1991) 
warned that integration might also result in rising income inequalities. 
The same is suggested by some newer growth models (Romer, 1986; 
Lucas, 1988), which refer to R&D efforts and brain drain. One of the 
most comprehensive empirical studies until now (Ben-David, 2002) Matkowski, Z. and Próchniak, M.                Real Economic Convergence in the EU 
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concluded that per capita income levels throughout the world over 
the period 1960-1985 have rather diverged. Thus, the debate about 
economic convergence and the effects of integration is by no way 
closed. This means that there is still much room for discussion about 
the factors conducive to economic convergence or divergence, and a 
need for empirical research focusing on different groups of countries.  
 
   This paper aims to assess growth and cyclical convergence among 
the eight CEE countries that have recently accessed the EU: the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak 
Republic, and Slovenia, as well as their convergence to the EU 
‘core’. Income convergence (a tendency to reduce the income gap) 
will be analysed by comparing real GDP  per capita levels and 
growth rates, and cyclical convergence (a tendency towards a 
uniform pattern of cyclical fluctuations) will be assessed by industrial 
production indices and industrial confidence indicators.  
 
   There are many analyses of growth patterns in the CEE area, 
including our own (Matkowski, 2004). For a comprehensive review 
see: Havrylyshyn (2001). There were also many analyses of 
economic convergence of CEE countries towards the EU (e.g. 
Baldwin  et al., 1997; Breuss, 2001; European Commission, 2001; 
Doyle et al., 2001; Lejour et al., 2001; Martín et al., 2001; Sarajevs, 
2001; Marini, 2003; EEAG, 2004; Kutan and Yigit, 2004; Kejak et al., 
2004; Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2004). Most of them refer to the 
income-level convergence, but some also include examination of 
cyclical conformity. However, we saw no study devoted to both 
aspects of economic convergence between those countries and 
towards the EU. Most probably, this is the first such attempt, which 
supplements our earlier analysis (Matkowski and Próchniak, 2004). 
 
   The paper consists of six parts. Section 1 is this introduction. 
Section 2 specifies the data used. Section 3 explains the concept of 
income convergence and presents the empirical results. Section 4 
brings the results on cyclical convergence. Section 5 analyses trade International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.1-3(2004) 
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links between CEE countries and the EU, which are essential in any 




For the purposes of our analysis we have compiled the following data: 
a)  GDP per capita at PPP (US $) for the individual CEE countries 
as well as for the former EU members; 
b)  GDP per capita at PPP (US $) for the whole group of CEE 
countries and for the EU-15 area, calculated by dividing total GDP 
and total population of all the countries included in a group; 
c)  industrial production indexes for CEE countries and the euro area; 
d)  industrial confidence indicators (based on survey data) for CEE 
countries and the euro area; 
e)  trade flows between CEE countries and their major trade 
partners. 
 
   Annual GDP per capita data for the period 1993-2003 have been 
derived from IMF  World Economic Outlook Database  (April 
2004). Monthly data on industrial production are taken from web 
pages of CEE Central Statistical Offices. In the case of the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia they are supplemented by OECD data from 
Main Economic Indicators. In the case of Lithuania data on 
industrial production are taken from the Lithuanian statistical bulletin. 
Data on industrial confidence are mostly taken from OECD Main 
Economic Indicators. I n the case of Slovenia and Lithuania the 
OECD data were updated using national statistical bulletins. Data on 
industrial production and industrial confidence cover various periods 
(maximum 10 years: January 1995  – April 2004). Some quarterly 
data have been interpolated into monthly indices. 
 
   GDP per capita data are analysed in a natural-logarithm form. 
Time series of the industrial production index were transformed into 
growth rates against the same month of the previous year if source 
data had other basis (in order to eliminate seasonality and to avoid Matkowski, Z. and Próchniak, M.                Real Economic Convergence in the EU 
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instationarity), then smoothed with 12-month moving average and 
standardised. Time series of industrial confidence indicators, originally 
expressed as net answer balances, were only transformed into  2000 
= 100 form (assuming that they are stationary by their very nature), 
smoothed by 12-month moving average, and standardised. Towards 
the end of period the moving average was successively shortened as 
to avoid cutting the series at the end. After these transformations 
both the industrial production indexes and industrial confidence 
indicators (except perhaps for the first and the last year) do not 
reveal seasonal fluctuations and irregular movements, and they are 
comparable. Data on trade flows come from the  newest EBRD 
Transition Report  and IMF  Direction of Trade Statistics. They 
have been converted into percentage shares of total exports and 
imports of the countries concerned.  
 
3. Income convergence 
 
3.1. Theoretical framework 
   One of the most important conclusions from neoclassical models of 
economic growth (Solow, 1956; Mankiw  et al., 1992) is their 
confirmation of growth convergence, or more precisely, conditional b-
convergence. This means that a less developed economy (with a 
lower GDP per capita) tends to grow faster than a more developed 
one. The convergence is conditional because it takes place when both 
economies tend to reach the same steady-state. If the less developed 
economy always grew faster, we would deal with absolute 
convergence. 
 
   Another measure is  s-convergence. It appears if income 
differences between the economies concerned decrease over time. 
Income differentiation can be measured by the variance or standard 
deviation of real GDP per capita. b-convergence is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for the existence of s-convergence. Income 
differences between countries can rise and at the same time less 
developed countries may develop faster (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.1-3(2004) 
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1992). The main argument behind the convergence hypothesis is that, 
given the same exogenous technology, countries with low per capita 
income and low capital per worker would offer higher returns to 
capital.  
   This would attract more foreign capital, insuring a higher 
accumulation rate and faster growth. The evident condition is that the 
economies concerned are open. Empirical results on income 
convergence depend to a large extent on the homogeneity of 
analysed group of countries. The analyses that include more or less 
similar economies (e.g. OECD members) confirm the existence of 
convergence, whereas the analyses comprising different groups of 
countries bring some evidence of income-level divergence. Let us 
present the conclusions f rom the Solow model concerning the 
conditional b-convergence. In particular, we wish to show that (i) an 
economy starting from a low GDP per capita level (and low capital 
per worker) and tending towards a steady-state may grow faster than 
the economy starting from a higher income and capital level; ( ii) 
economies approaching different steady-states need not converge. 
 
   The basic equation which describes the drive of the economy 
towards a steady-state in the Solow model is: 
t t t k x n k sf k ) ( ) (
.
d + + - =  or 
) (
) (







, (1a, 1b) 
where:  
k – capital per unit of effective labour, 
k &  – increase of capital per effective labour unit, 
gk – growth rate of capital, 
n – growth rate of population, 
x – rate of exogenous technical progress, 
d – rate of capital depreciation, 
s – saving rate, 
f(k) – production function. 
    Matkowski, Z. and Próchniak, M.                Real Economic Convergence in the EU 
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   Since output is proportional to capital (according to the neoclassical 
production function), similar equations characterise the dynamics of 
GDP per unit of effective labour. The best way to prove (i) is to 
draw both parts of equation (1b) on the chart. This is shown in  
Figure 1a. The growth rate equals to the vertical distance between 
the curve sf(kt)/kt and the line n + x + d. The economy starting from 
capital level k0 and reaching the steady-state capital value k* would 
reveal a decreasing growth rate. Thus, less developed economy 
would grow faster than a more developed one.  
 
   The convergence is conditional because it is limited to the situation 
when both economies tend to reach the same steady-state. In order 
to prove (ii), let us consider two countries: a poor one and a rich one, 
with different saving rates. Since saving rate in the rich country is 
higher, the steady-state value of capital in the rich country is also 
higher than in the poor country. This is shown in Figure 1b. Although 
the rich country starts from a higher capital level, now it also reveals 
a more rapid growth, because it tends to a different steady-state than 
the poor country. In this case, both economies would not converge. 
Thus, we have proved that b-convergence is conditional. 
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   An important target of empirical research is to estimate the value 
of parameter b, which determines the speed of convergence towards 
the steady-state, according to the following equation: 
( ) t y y y g ln * ln - » b .  (2) 
 
   The parameter  b informs what part of the distance from the 
steady-state the economy is covering during one period. For example, 
if b = 0.02, the economy covers annually 2% of the distance. 
In order to calculate  b in an empirical analysis, we have to 









T a a + =
.  (3) 
   This equation allows us to verify the existence of b-convergence. 
The explained variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP 
per capita between period T and 0 while the explanatory variable is 
GDP per capita level in period 0. If parameter a1 is negative, b-






a b + - =
.  (4) 
Estimating this equation enables us to verify the existence of b-
convergence. 
 
3.2. Income convergence among the CEE countries 
    Here we wish to test empirically the existence of  b- and  s-
convergence among the CEE countries. It is interesting to see 
whether the less developed economies in this region grew faster than 
the more developed ones during the transition period.  
 
b-convergence 
The analysed group began the transition process towards an open 
market economy with a transformation crisis marked by a deep fall of 
GDP in early 1990s. For example, in a single year 1992 real GDP per Matkowski, Z. and Próchniak, M.                Real Economic Convergence in the EU 
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capita fell by 21.7% in Estonia, 21.3% in Lithuania, and 34.9% in 
Latvia (IMF, 2002). In most CEE countries the crisis ended till 1993. 




   Due to the similar development level, similar economic structures, 
and largely the same course of economic reforms, but also due to 
regional cooperation and common policies aimed at the EU accession, 
the CEE countries should reveal some income-level c onvergence. 
The more so because the EU has pursued a deliberate structural and 
regional policy aimed at reducing development differences. Financial 
aid was mainly addressed to less developed regions and countries to 
stimulate their economic growth. 
 
   In order to verify b-convergence, we have to estimate the slope of 
regression equation (3). We did this for the whole period 1993-2003 
as well as for two equal-length subperiods: 1993-1998 and 1998-2003. 
The results are presented in Table 1 and in Figure 2.  
 
Table 1. Regression results for b-convergence  
Period 
0 ˆ a   1 ˆ a   0 ˆ a t   1 ˆ a t   R
2  b-conv.  b ˆ  
1993-
2003  0.32  –0.03  4.04  –3.28  0.6416  yes  0.0340 
1993-
1998  0.29  –0.03  2.52  –1.98  0.3942  yes  0.0269 
1998-
2003  0.40  –0.04  2.74  –2.35  0.4797  yes  0.0409 
 
                                                                 
1 However, over the period 1989-2002, only Poland, Slovenia, and 
Hungary have noticed a considerable increase in real GDP: by 30%, 18%, 
and 12% respectively. In the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic the 
increase was less than 10%. The Baltic states saw a decrease as compared to 
1989: Estonia by 7%, and Latvia and Lithuania by 23% (EBRD, 2003). International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.1-3(2004) 
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   The first column in Table 1 indicates the period. The next columns 
give the estimated values of parameters  a0 and a1,  t-statistics, p-
values, and R
2. The last two columns inform about the existence of b-
convergence (answer is ‘yes’ if GDP growth rate is negatively 
correlated with the initial income level), giving the estimated value of 
b coefficient. 
 
Figure 2. GDP per capita growth rate over the period 1993-2003  
and the initial GDP per capita level  
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   For each analysed period the results confirm the existence of b-
convergence. It means that less developed countries within the group 
grew faster than more developed ones. For example, Latvia and 
Estonia, the poorest CEE economies in 1993, recorded the highest 
growth rate over the period 1993-2003. The value of b coefficient for 
the whole period is 3.4%.  
 
   This indicates a weak income-level convergence between CEE 
countries but a relatively fast one compared with 2% as reported by 
some other studies (Hagemann, 2004). Given our estimate of the rate 
of convergence, CEE countries would need about 20 years to reduce 
by a half the distance to their common steady-state. This means that 
although catching-up process between the eight CEE economies is 
LAT 
EST 
POL  LIT  SLK  HUN 
CZE 
SLO Matkowski, Z. and Próchniak, M.                Real Economic Convergence in the EU 
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evident, the equalisation of their development levels will take a lot of 
time. 
 
   A more precise analysis shows that  b coefficient in the second 
subperiod 1998-2003 (4.1%) was significantly higher than in the first 
subperiod 1993-1998 (2.7%). It is very likely that a faster 
convergence in the second subperiod was linked to the planned EU 
enlargement. In the early years of transition adjustment and structural 
policies were not yet strongly pursued.  
   When approaching the EU accession, the less developed countries 
within this group have managed to accelerate their growth. This is 
best evidenced by the Baltic states, which grew very rapidly in the 
2000s. Our findings about the existence of convergence are 
supported by quite good regression statistics (R
2 = 0.64 for the whole 
period) and significance of explanatory variables (P < 0.05 for the 
whole period). 
 
Figure 2 shows a negative correlation between the average annual 
GDP per capita growth rate over the period 1993-2003 and the initial 
GDP per capita level. The points marked on the chart, indicating the 
position of individual countries, fit very well the trend line, indicating 
an evident convergence.  
 
s-convergence 
As our research has largely confirmed the existence of  b-
convergence among the CEE countries, we would also like to know 
whether income differentiation among them has also decreased. In 
order to answer this question, we have to test s-convergence. 
 
   Although the less advanced CEE countries grow in general faster 
than the more advanced ones, income dispersion between them need 
not to decrease systematically. There are various random demand 
and supply shocks, both internal and external, that a ffect the 
individual economies and throw them temporarily away from the path 
towards the steady-state. International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.1-3(2004) 
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   To test  s-convergence we analysed income dispersion by 
estimating the trend line of standard deviation of log GDP per capita.  
 
   The calculations were made for the whole period 1993-2003 as 
well as for two subperiods: 1993-1998 and 1998-2003. The results are 
presented in Table 2 and Figure 3. s-convergence exists if the trend 
line slopes down, meaning that income dispersion tends to decline. 
Table 2. Regression results for s-convergence 
Period 
0 ˆ a   1 ˆ a   0 ˆ a t   1 ˆ a t   R
2  s-conv.
1993 – 
2003  0.32  –0.01  46.75  –8.99  0.8999  yes 
1993 – 
1998  0.31  –0.01  22.58  –2.15  0.5359  yes 
1998 – 
2003  0.32  –0.01  26.32  –6.67  0.9174  yes 
 
Figure 3. Standard deviation of GDP per capita, 1993-2003 

































































   The results for the whole period confirm the existence of  s-
convergence. The decreasing trend of income dispersion between 
these countries is also clearly visible in Figure 3. Our findings are also 
supported by very good regression statistics (R
2 = 0.90, P = 0.000). 
 Matkowski, Z. and Próchniak, M.                Real Economic Convergence in the EU 
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   Figure 3 also shows that even if income dispersion among the CEE 
countries was generally decreasing, in some years it rose. At the 
beginning of the period, in the years 1993-1995, income differentiation 
among those countries increased. Since 1996 (except of 1999) it has 
been decreasing, as confirmed by regression results for the second 
subperiod of 1998-2003.  
 
3.3. Income convergence towards the EU 
   Our empirical analysis also confirms the existence of  b-
convergence between CEE countries and the EU-15. b-convergence 
has been evidenced for both the individual countries as well as for the 
whole regions. Figure 4 shows that the average annual growth rate 
during 1993-2003 for current 23 EU members was inversely related 
to their initial GDP per capita level. 
 
   In Figure 4, the position of individual countries has been marked by 
dark rhombuses (CEE countries) and triangles (former EU 
members). As we can see, there is an evident negative relation 
between the initial income level and the growth rate. The estimated 
trend line for 23 EU countries, including 15 former EU members and 
8 new entrants, has a slope –0.0176, which implies that b-coefficient 
is 1.94%. The value of R
2 is deteriorated mainly due to two countries 
which diverge much from the common experience: Ireland and 
Luxembourg. If we could exclude these two untypical cases from our 
calculations, we would get significantly better regression results.  
 
   The convergence is also seen in a regional approach. The big 
squares in Figure 6 indicate the initial average GDP per capita level 
and the average GDP growth rate in the EU-15 and among the CEE 
countries. The average growth rate in the CEE was higher than in the 
EU-15 while the initial GDP per capita was much lower. The trend 
line for the two regions has a slope –0.0195 (R
2 = 1 is obvious) with 
b-coefficient equal to 2.17%. 
 International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.1-3(2004) 
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   The above analysis indicates a relatively slow convergence process 
between the new EU entrants and the former EU member countries 
as regards income-level equalisation. We should not expect a rapid 
equalisation of the average income level in CEE and EU-15. The b 
coefficient equal to ca 2% indicates that the least developed countries 
of the extended EU would need about 35 years to decrease by a half 
their income gap towards the leader. This means that 35 years will go 
by before the CEE economies increase their income level from the 
current 50% to 75% of the EU-15 average. 
 
Figure 4. GDP per capita growth rate over the period 1993-2003  
and the initial GDP per capita level  
y = -0,0195x + 0,2285
R
2 = 1
y = -0,0176x + 0,216
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   The new and old EU members also reveal s-convergence, both in 
the country-by-country examination and in a regional approach. 
Figure 5 presents the tendency of the standard deviation of GDP per 
capita between 23 countries of the enlarged EU and between the 
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Figure 5. Standard deviation of GDP per capita, 1993-2003 
y = -0,0076x + 0,5311
R2 = 0,9027




































































Trend line (country differentiation)
Trend line (regional differentiation)
 
   As we can see, the difference between the CEE countries and the 
EU-15 as regards the average income level is clearly decreasing 
(slope of the trend line = –0.0087,  R
2 = 0.96). It means that the 
income levels in the new EU countries become closer to the average 
income level seen in the EU-15 (though the income gap is still very 
large). The differences in income levels tend also to decrease in the 
cross-section analysis including all the 23 countries (slope –0.0076, 
R
2 = 0.90). 
 
3.4. What is new in our findings? 
 
   Comparing our findings with the results of other empirical analyses, 
there are some differences caused by different source data, 
countries, and indicators analysed, and the period  covered. Our 
previous analysis (Matkowski and Próchniak, 2004) on economic 
convergence of the EU accession countries, that covered the period 
1993-2001 and was based on  Euromonitor data, indicated a 
significantly weaker speed of convergence. Estrin  et al. (2001) did 
not found any convergence between 26 post-socialist countries and 
well developed economies during the period 1970-1998.  
 
   Only Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovak Republic proved a real 
convergence towards well developed economies. Koèenda (2001) International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.1-3(2004) 
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indicates some evidence of stochastic convergence of industrial 
production indices in all the analysed groups of post-socialist countries 
in the period 1991-1998. However, the updated and slightly modified 
analysis of Kutan and Yigit (2004) does not c onfirm a regular 
existence of convergence.  
 
   The EU enlargement contributed to several theoretical papers 
concerning the convergence process. Kejak  et al. (2004) extended 
the two-sector Uzawa-Lucas endogenous growth model so as to 
explain the growth path of new EU countries. They used this 
modified model to estimate the speed of income equalisation between 
Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary, and the EU-15. Under an 
optimistic assumption of the growth rate of 4%, Poland would 
achieve the current GDP per capita average level of EU-15 in 35 
years, the Czech Republic – in 23 years, and Hungary – in 30 years.  
 
   However, under a more realistic assumption about the growth rate 
of 3%, the Czech Republic may suffer from a temporary recession 
just after the EU accession whereas Poland and Hungary would face 
the recession following the strong economic growth at the beginning 
of their EU membership.  
 
   The newest EEAG report (EEAG, 2004) includes some estimations 
concerning the catching-up process of CEE countries. T he most 
optimistic data suggest that Slovenia would reach the income level 
equal to 90% of the future average for the euro area in 30 years. In 
the same time, the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic 
would achieve 75-80% of the EU-15 average, whereas Poland and 
the Baltic states 65-70%. If the conclusions about growth 
convergence among the CEE countries arising from the previous 
analyses have been quite uncertain, this study is the first to confirm 
the existence of clear-cut income-convergence between the CEE and 
towards the EU. 
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4. Cyclical convergence  
 
4.1. Assumptions and the method 
   The eight CEE countries included in this group are more or less 
similar as regards their development level, economic structure, 
progress of transformation, economic policies, international links, and 
the dependence on foreign markets. Thus, it is very likely that 
economic growth of these countries is determined by similar factors. 
We may also suppose that they would react similarly to internal and 
external shocks. If our assumptions are correct, it is very likely that 
the analysed countries would also reveal similar cyclical fluctuations. 
However, this hypothesis should be explicitly proved. 
 
   At the same time, all the CEE countries now are largely engaged in 
trade with Western Europe, being also heavily dependent on FDI-
inflows. Therefore, we may expect that they will develop more or 
less similarly to the EU ‘core’ as represented by the euro area. 
 
   Our analysis covers the period from January 1995 till April 2004, 
for which we have the necessary data. We analyse here monthly 
data on the growth rates of industrial production (year-over-year), as 
reported by official statistics, and industrial confidence indicators, 
compiled from business surveys. All the data have been smoothed 
with 12-month moving average (successively shortened at both ends 
in order to avoid cutting the series), and normalised against the long-
term average.  
 
   Cyclical conformity can be assessed by means of correlation 
coefficients. If the correlation is high, we may assume that there is a 
good synchronisation of cyclical developments. We must, however, 
be aware about spurious correlations, which may be purely accidental 
or due to the both-side dependence on a third common market, 
notably the EU. Our analysis of cyclical convergence among the new 
EU entrants supplements the earlier studies on cyclical convergence 
within the EU (e.g. J. Kröger et al., 2003). International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.1-3(2004) 
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4.2. Cyclical conformance within the CEE 
 
Industrial production 
Correlation coefficients between industrial production growth rates in 
the analysed countries are presented in Table 3. The grey cells show 
significant positive correlations, suggesting cyclical convergence. 
 
Table 3. Correlation coefficients of industrial production  
 
  CZE  HUN  POL  SLK  SLO  EST  LAT  LIT 
CZE  1.00  -0.36  ns  0.72   ns  0.37   0.72  0.82  
HUN -0.36  1.00   0.47   ns  0.59   ns  ns  -0.37  
POL  ns  0.47   1.00   ns  0.20   0.20   ns  ns 
SLK  0.72   ns  ns  1.00   0.53   0.66  0.73   0.61  
SLO  ns  0.59  0.20   0.53   1.00   0.39   ns  -0.33  
EST  0.37   ns  0.20   0.66   0.39   1.00   0.81   0.38  
LAT  0.72   ns  ns  0.73  ns  0.81  1.00  0.72  
LIT  0.82   -0.37  ns  0.61   -0.33   0.38   0.72   1.00  
ns – not significant. 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   The predominance of grey cells in the table means that the new EU 
entrants from the CEE area have generally revealed a good cyclical 
conformity among themselves. The best conformity is found between 
the neighbour countries, with close economic ties. This concerns, 
quite n aturally, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, two 
parts of the former Czechoslovakia. Much of the same applies to the 
Baltic states, even though Lithuania rather diverges from Estonia. 
Poland and Hungary, although weakly or negatively correlated with 
the other CEE countries, are quite well correlated between 
themselves. Slovenia shows some correlation with Hungary, Slovakia 
and Estonia, though the last one may be spurious. Matkowski, Z. and Próchniak, M.                Real Economic Convergence in the EU 
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   The conformity of cyclical fluctuations within the group, as 
reflected by the industrial production growth rates, is illustrated by 
Figure 6. It has been split into three separate graphs showing cyclical 
developments in three subgroups: (a) the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia; (b) Hungary and Poland; (c) the Baltic states: 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The graphs show quite a good 
similarity of cyclical fluctuations in each subgroup. This division of the 
analysed group does not mean that the group as a whole does not 
reveal any cyclical convergence. Since 1997 cyclical tendencies in all 
the CEE countries were more or less similar until the slowdown in 
2000-01. Since 2002 most CEE economies reveal again a quite 
vigorous growth. Thus, we are allowed to say that the CEE countries 




It is also interesting to check cyclical convergence within this group in 
the light of the survey data on industrial confidence indicator. 
Since industrial confidence indicators are usually stationary, we 
simply use their deseasonalised 2000=100 indexes, with no allowance 
for trend. Correlation coefficients between industrial confidence 
indicators in individual CEE countries are presented in Table 4, and 
their time series are shown in Figure 7.  
 
Table 4. Correlation coefficients of industrial confidence  
  CZE  HUN  POL  SLK  SLO  EST  LAT  LIT 
CZE  1.00   -0.45  ns  0.80  0.78   0.50   0.64   0.66  
HUN  -0.45   1.00   0.57   -0.33   0.25   -0.43   -0.73   -0.71  
POL  ns  0.57   1.00   0.35   0.52   ns  -0.48   ns 
SLK  0.80   -0.33   0.35   1.00   0.72   0.68   0.55   0.70  
SLO  0.78   0.25   0.52   0.72   1.00   0.40   0.26   0.44  
EST  0.50   -0.43  ns  0.68   0.40   1.00   0.83   0.81  
LAT  0.64   -0.73   -0.48   0.55   0.26   0.83   1.00   0.97  
LIT  0.66   -0.71   ns  0.70   0.44   0.81   0.97   1.00  
ns – not significant. International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.1-3(2004) 
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   In general, industrial confidence indicators compile from business 
surveys are well correlated with the industrial production index. This 
is why the results obtained from the analysis of both indicators are 
more or less similar.  
 
   The analysis of the industrial confidence indicators generally 
supports our findings based on the examination of the industrial 
production index. The group as a whole shows quite a good 
synchronisation of cyclical movements, the more so when it is divided 
into three subgroups as before.  
 
   Hungary is well correlated with Poland. The Czech Republic and 
the Slovak Republic are very well correlated between themselves, 
and also with Slovenia. The Baltic states are almost perfectly 
correlated between themselves. The correlation for the whole group 
is weaker, but still significant except the divergence between the 
developments in Poland and Hungary on the one part and the Czech 
Republic and the Baltic states on the other.   
 
   The major limitation of our analysis is the shortness of the available 
time series, covering just 6-9 years. Therefore, the results should be 
interpreted with caution. We can hope that after the EU accession, 
the countries of this group will maintain their mutual links. If it is so, 
they may continue to display similar trends in their economic 
development, especially within the regional subgroups.  
4.3. Cyclical convergence with the euro area 
 
   As the CEE countries are heavily engaged in economic cooperation 
and increasingly integrated with the EU, we may suppose that they 
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Table 5. Correlation coefficients between industrial production  
in the euro area and in the new EU countries 
  CZE  HUN  POL  SLK  SLO  EST  LAT  LIT 
EURO -0.25  0.91  0.29  ns  0.65  ns  ns  -0.32 
ns – not significant. 
 
 
Table 6. Correlation coefficients between industrial confidence in the 
euro area and in the new EU countries 
  CZE  HUN  POL  SLK  SLO  EST  LAT  LIT 
EURO 0.55   0.58   0.35   0.36   0.74   ns  ns  ns 
ns – not significant. 
 
 
Figure 8. Industrial production growth rates in the euro area  
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Figure 9. Industrial confidence in the euro area  





































































































































































































EURO HUN POL SLO CZE SLK
 
 
   To verify this hypothesis, we compare industrial production indexes 
and industrial confidence indicators of each of the EU accession 
country of CEE with the analogous indices for the euro area (EU-
12). The period covered by this part of the analysis is shorter because 
the euro area exists since 1998. The methods used are the same as in 
the previous section.  
 
   Correlation coefficients are presented in Tables 5 and 6. In terms 
of the industrial production growth rates Hungary, Slovenia, and 
Poland reveal significantly positive correlation with the euro area. In 
terms of industrial confidence indicators almost all CEE countries, 
save the Baltic states, reveal quite a good correspondence with 
cyclical developments in the euro area. Figures 8 and 9 show the 
similarity between cyclical fluctuations in the selected CEE countries 
and the euro area, as reflected by the industrial production growth 
rates and industrial confidence indicators, though at the end of period 
there is a divergence between the slack in the euro area and a 
continuous growth in most CEE countries. Our analysis suggests that 
there is a significant symmetry in business cycles between the CEE 
countries and the euro area. This is mainly due to intensive trade and 
capital flows, but also due to similar reactions to the external demand Matkowski, Z. and Próchniak, M.                Real Economic Convergence in the EU 
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and supply shocks. After the EU accession this tendency can 
become even more pronounced.  
 
   The newest EBRD report on transition (EBRD, 2003, p. 49-51) 
brings another attempt to evidence cyclical convergence between the 
CEE accession countries and the euro area. Co-movements i n 
business cycles in the period 1993-2003 are shown on graphs as the 
difference between output gaps in each CEE country and the 
eurozone. Output gaps have been calculated as the difference 
between actual and trend output as measured by the quarterly volume 
index of GDP and its HP trend. Though the interpretation of the 
alleged tendency towards cyclical conformity with EU is quite 
convincing, the empirical evidence is not so clear. The graphs reveal 
some similarity of business cycles between CEE countries, but no 
clear-cut tendency towards their convergence with the euro area. 
 
5. Trade links 
 
   To assess the significance of our findings about economic 
convergence among the CEE accession countries and their 
convergence towards the EU, we should analyse their trade links 
which constitute the main transmission channel of international 
cooperation. Trade flows, notably exports, are especially important in 
any reasoning about the business cycle synchronisation while capital 
flows and labour movement may be more p ertinent to growth 
convergence. Trade links of the CEE countries can be reconstructed 
on the basis of the EBRD and IMF data on the directions of trade. 
 
   Table 7 shows main directions of trade in CEE countries as percent 
of their total exports and imports. Within-the-region trade now 
represents only about 10% of their total trade whereas the trade with 
the EU-15 amounts to more than 60% of the total. For the countries 
most integrated with the EU (the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, 
and Hungary) this share is between 65 and 70%, and for the 
remaining CEE countries it is between 50 and 60%. The share of International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.1-3(2004) 
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intra-regional trade tends to be inversely related to the intensity of 
trade with the EU, ranging from 6% in Hungary and Slovenia, 10% in 
Poland, 12-14% in the Czech Republic and the Baltic states, to 24% 
in the Slovak Republic. There are many reasons for a relatively slight 
intra-regional trade, including substitutive rather than complementary 
production structures, relatively low international competitiveness of 
many export products, and weak capital links. The common tendency 
to sell more than to buy from the neighbour is also hampering mutual 
exchange. As a result, despite all the efforts to promote regional 
trade under CEFTA, its share in total CEE trade between 1995 and 
2002 rather decreased while the share of trade with the EU 
increased considerably.  
 
Table7. Directions of trade in CEE countries  
(percent of total exports and imports) 
Country  Year  Within the group  With the EU 
    Exp.  Imp.  Avg.  Exp.  Imp.  Avg. 
CZE  1995  25.4  14.8  20.1  54.0  55.9  55.0 
  2002  15.8  8.7  12.3  68.8  71.7  70.3 
SLK  1995  45.8  30.6  38.2  37.4  34.8  36.1 
  2002  28.4  19.9  24.2  59.5  52.3  55.9 
SLO  1995  5.0  6.2  5.6  67.3  69.3  68.3 
  2002  7.7  6.8  7.3  61.9  72.0  67.0 
HUN  1995  8.4  5.6  7.0  62.8  61.5  62.2 
  2002  6.6  5.1  5.9  73.5  57.5  65.5 
POL  1995  6.7  6.3  6.5  70.1  64.7  67.4 
  2002  11.8  8.0  9.9  67.6  67.5  67.6 
EST  1995  25.4  14.8  20.1  54.0  55.9  55.0 
  2002  15.8  8.7  12.3  68.8  71.7  70.3 
LAT  1995  12.3  12.4  12.4  44.2  50.0  47.1 
  2002  13.8  15.0  14.4  62.3  52.3  57.3 
LIT  1995  14.1  5.8  10.0  36.4  37.2  36.8 
  2002  24.1  4.0  14.1  47.1  51.2  49.2 
Avg.  1995  17.9  12.1  15.0  53.3  53.7  53.5 
  2002  15.5  9.5  12.6  63.7  62.0  62.9 
Source:  EBRD, Transition Report 2003: Integration and Regional Cooperation, 
London 2003, p. 86, table A. 4. 1. 1. Averages were calculated by the authors.  
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Tables 8 and 9 bring more detailed information about the trade 
links between CEE countries and their major trade partners. There is 
some discrepancy between the data included in Table 7 (taken from 
the EBRD report) and the data appearing in Tables 8 and 9 (compiled 
by ourselves). Though all data are based on the same source (IMF), 
our own estimates as regards CEE intra-regional trade and their trade 
with EU differ from those calculated by the EBRD. For most 
countries the difference is not big, except for Estonia. One of the 
reasons may be the difference between the original data reported by 
this country and the IMF estimates derived from cross-country data.  
 
Significant trade links o f CEE countries, as reflected by the 
partner’s share of more than 5% in their total exports and imports, 
have been marked by grey cells. Such links only exist between the 
Czech Republic and Slovak Republic and among the Baltic states. 
Slovakia has also significant exports to Hungary and Poland. For 
Slovenia, Hungary and Poland, the CEE market is less important. At 
the same time, all CEE countries are heavily dependent on the EU 
markets. The share of CEE exports to the EU ranges from 48% in 
Lithuania to 75% in Hungary while the share of imports from the EU 
is between 49% in Lithuania and 62% in Poland.  
 
Germany, as the largest single economy within the EU, is the 
major trade partner to all the CEE accession countries except of 
Estonia (which is more linked w ith Finland and Sweden). For 
Lithuania, Germany is the main source of imports and the second 
biggest export market (after the U.K.). Russia remains an important 
source of imports (mainly of oil, gas and other raw materials) for 
most CEE countries (except of Slovenia). Russia is also an important 
export market for the Slovak Republic and the Baltic states, but no 
more for the remaining CEE countries. However, all the CEE 
countries are quite sensitive to political and economic developments in 
Russia because of their dependence on energy supplies, substantial 
capital flows, and the impact of political developments. 
 International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.1-3(2004) 
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Table 8. CEE exports by trading partners in 2002  
(percent of total exports) 
*  CZE HUN POL  SLK  SLO  EST  LAT  LIT  CEE8EU15 GER 
CZE  -  2.4  4.7  7.7  0.6  0.1  0.2  0.4  16.1  68.6  36.6 
HUN  1.9  -  2.1  1.5  0.9  0.1  0.1  0.2  6.8  75.0  35.5 
POL  4.0  2.3  -  1.4  0.3  0.3  0.7  2.3  11.3  68.8  32.3 
SLK  15.2  5.5  5.3  -  1.0  0.0  0.2  0.6  27.8  60.6  26.0 
SLO  1.8  1.8  2.8  1.2  -  0.0  0.1  0.3  8.0  59.3  24.7 
EST  0.3  1.0  0.9  0.1  0.0  -  7.7  4.1  14.1  57.2  8.3 
LAT  0.6  0.4  1.5  0.4  0.1  5.9  -  8.2  17.1  59.6  15.3 
LIT  0.5  0.5  3.5  0.1  0.0  3.8  9.7  -  18.1  48.4  10.4 
* Exporting countries are listed in the first column and the recipient countries are 
shown at the head. Source: Own calculations based on IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, 
December 2003. 
 
Table 9. CEE imports by trading partners in 2002  
(percent of total imports) 
*  CZE HUN POL  SLK  SLO  EST  LAT  LIT  CEE8EU15 GER 
CZE  -  2.0  4.1  5.3  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.1  12.1  61.0  32.9 
HUN  2.3  -  2.5  1.8  0.6  0.1  0.0  0.1  7.4  56.2  24.2 
POL  3.2  1.7  -  1.5  0.6  0.1  0.1  0.3  7.5  61.7  24.3 
SLK  15.1  2.7  3.2  -  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  21.8  50.3  23.1 
SLO  2.5    1.5  1.4  -  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.4  68.0  19.2 
EST  0.9  0.4  2.4  0.2  0.2  -  2.3  2.8  9.2  54.8  11.1 
LAT  1.4  0.9  5.0  0.7  0.3  6.2  -  9.8  24.3  52.9  17.2 
LIT  1.4  0.8  5.0  0.3  0.5  1.1  1.7  -  10.8  48.6
a  17.8 
* Importing countries are listed in the first column and countries of origin are shown at 
the head. 
a Authors’ own estimate based on source data (including the estimated imports from 
France, reported as null).  
Source: Own calculations based on IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, December 2003. 
 
   This analysis indicates that all the CEE accession countries are 
heavily dependent on the EU market, so they are apt to follow the 
rhythm of the business cycle seen in the EU, especially in Germany. 
Intra-regional trade links may explain to some extent the similarity of Matkowski, Z. and Próchniak, M.                Real Economic Convergence in the EU 
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business cycles between the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, 
and among the Baltic states, but not between the other CEE 
countries. Cyclical convergence between CEE countries and the EU 
is caused by the existing economic links as well as by a rising policy 
coordination. At the same time the conformity of cyclical patterns 
among CEE countries may be attributed to three factors: (a) echoing 
the fluctuations in the EU; (b) similar sequence of internal shocks 
caused by the transformation process; (c) subregional economic ties, 
e.g. between the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, and between 
the Baltic states. The current size of intra-regional economic 
cooperation among the CEE countries cannot explain their tendency 
towards cyclical convergence within the group. 
    
   Since the current shares of CEE trade with the EU-15 are already 
high and significant reductions in trade barriers have taken place 
before the actual enlargement, we should not expect a big increase in 
trade and capital flows after the EU accession. Cyclical convergence 
towards EU may nevertheless improve with the resulting more 




1)  There is a clear-cut convergence among the eight EU accession 
countries of CEE as to their income levels. The GDP growth 
rates in the period 1993-2003 were generally negatively 
correlated with the initial GDP  per capita level. Income 
differences between individual countries tend to diminish, 
especially during the last few years.  
2)  As regards cyclical convergence, CEE countries should be 
divided into three subgroups: (a) Czech Republic and Slovak 
Republic; (b) Hungary and Poland; (c) the Baltic states. Slovenia 
may be included in one of the two first subgroups. Each subgroup 
reveals a good conformity of cyclical fluctuations while the 
correlation with other subgroups is weak. International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies. Vol.1-3(2004) 
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3)  All the considered CEE countries reveal a strong economic 
convergence towards the EU, both as regards income levels and 
business cycles. The accession countries tend to develop faster 
than the elder EU members. As the result, the income gap 
between CEE and EU is generally decreasing, although it still 
remains very large. Most CEE countries also reveal quite a good 
conformity of cyclical fluctuations with the euro area. 
4)  The existing trade and capital links between CEE countries and 
the EU are already quite strong. Therefore, we should not expect 
a major improvement in real economic convergence just after the 
accession. Moreover, some divergence tendencies cannot be 
excluded.  
5)  The major limitation of our research is the relatively short period 
covered by the analysis. The research on the subject should be 
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